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LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
Plaintiffs in this action are M. Dalton Cannon, and his 
wife, Patricia Cannon. The only defendant in the instant appeal is 
the University of Utah. Defendant Malissa K. Austin was dismissed 
from this action pursuant to a separate settlement and is not a 
party to the instant appeal. R. 165-168. Defendants Brian Purvis 
and Kim Beglarian were dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the 
parties and are not parties to the instant appeal. R. 140-141. 
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THE UTAH COURT UP APPEALS 
STATi . Jl AH 
M. DALTON CANNON and PATRICIA : 
CANNON, 
: Case No. 920377-CA 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
: P r i o i it"''i »" I in 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Appellee, 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
T h e i n H f; a nil, d e l i on ,"n HIHOHI w i, i n i n I w \\i u.\ mai j iu i : .1. sc.i .1,«,.: 111; i on OJ 
t h e Supreme Coun ' Utah under Utah Code Ann, §78-2-2 13) I j) (Supp 
19S;i ursuan* 'ah Code Ann. §78 i?-2(4) (Supp 1992), and 
Z I A I.:"' I |K I |Mii|.i|i l.'J'i;,') 1 hi 1 HI :'oui:t. Has 
j u r i s d i c ? , ~i s - appeal by reason of 1 he t r a n s f e r of t h i s 
a c t i o n from the Supreme Court; of Utah to tiie Lit ah Coio t ul Appeals 
I I! C I I HI! ISSUES 
] , ~' " "ie University of Utah owe the plaintiffs a duty of 
care different from, and separate fronni, I ho oiilill i r itiil / 1 IWI, :l I I he 
gen* arge? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: -e; iftw!;c 1 , •*. • f summarv • :dgment, 
i- i n s t a n t a c t i o flvipw.c iliqlii 
iavora. j s i n g p a r t y , dec id ing whether t he t r i a l 
cour t p r o p e r l y g r an t ed judgment as a .matte- f -w t h e Court g ives 
u" l ie ferenr t - I n 11m M 1 a I m i i l " • I 1 \i <IOP« 11 
t o r co r i r ec tness . Mountain S t a t e s T e l , v . G a r f i e l d County, Hll P,2d 
184, 192 (Utah 1991). 
2. Can the University of Utah be held liable on a theory of 
landowner liability to the plaintiffs as "business invitees" for an 
accident that did not occur on land owned or controlled by the 
University of Utah? 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
3. Was any action, or inaction, of employees of the 
University of Utah a proximate cause of the complained of accident? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking the 
affidavits of Mr. Cannon and Mr. Lord? 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: In reviewing the decision of the trial 
court on the admissibility of evidence, this Court will not reverse 
such a decision absent an abuse of discretion affecting a party's 
substantial rights. Hardy v. Hardy. 776 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Defendants do not believe there are any statutes the 
interpretation of which are determinative of the issues presented 
in this action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, M. Dalton and Patricia Cannon, brought this action 
alleging that they were injured by the negligence of Malissa 
Austin, the driver of an automobile that struck the plaintiffs 
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while they were crossing South Campus Drive inside a crosswalk. R. 
2-6. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to add as additional 
defendants the University of Utah and two of its officers. R. 63-
71. The two officers of the University were dismissed pursuant to 
stipulation of the parties. R. 140-141. The plaintiffs settled 
with Ms. Austin and dismissed her from the action. R. 165-167. 
Plaintiffs then filed a new amended complaint in which the sole 
defendant was the University of Utah. R. 174-181. The University 
of Utah moved for summary judgment, which was granted. R. 248-249, 
430-435, 439-440. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their action 
against the University of Utah. R. 443-446. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
This action arises out of an auto/pedestrian accident on 
February 1, 1990 at approximately 6:57 p.m.. [R. 176 at 1 8] . It 
had been raining or snowing that afternoon and it was dark. [R. 
270] . Plaintiffs allege that they were using the cross walk to 
cross South Campus Drive in a northerly direction when a 1987 
Toyota Pick-up truck driven by Malissa K. Austin struck them. [R. 
176 at 1 8] . Officers Beglarian and Purvis were assigned to 
traffic control at the subject cross walk. [R. 267]. 
As was normal practice for traffic control at the subject 
cross walk, officers Beglarian and Purvis arrived there at 
approximately 6:30 p.m., or thereafter, parked the car in the 
center lane with the flashers on and set up flares. [R. 267-269, 
271, 276-279, 285, and 289]. At the time of the accident, the 
flares were still burning. [R. 272-273, 288]. 
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On the night in question, the plaintiffs were dressed in dark 
clothing, [R. 283] . Upon reaching the cross walk, the plaintiffs 
saw the police car parked in the median lane, but did not see the 
police officers anywhere. Mr. Cannon remarked to Mrs. Cannon that, 
"they're not going to stop the traffic for us now like they 
generally do.11 [R. 293]. Knowing that the police officers were 
not going to stop traffic for them, the plaintiffs waited for some 
cars to go by and then began to cross South Campus Drive. [R. 293] . 
The car driven by Ms. Austin struck the Cannons as they were 
nearing the inside lane, towards the north side of the South Campus 
Drive. [R. 281-282]. Prior to impact neither Officer Beglarian, 
nor Officer Purvis ever saw the Cannons. [R. 271, 287]. 
At the time of the accident, both officers were about to 
resume traffic control. [R. 274]. Officer Purvis was putting on 
his gloves and Officer Beglarian was looking South and exiting the 
car. [R. 269, 271, 286]. University police are not to engage in 
parking control. [R. 37-38]. 
Plaintiffs contend that the negligent acts of the defendant 
University of Utah and its employees were a proximate cause of the 
accident. [R. 16 at 1l6] In particular, plaintiffs contend that 
Officers Purvis and Beglarian, while on duty and acting within the 
scope of their employment, with the University of Utah acted 
negligently by: (1) failing to monitor or direct pedestrian traffic 
crossing the pedestrian cross walk or halt oncoming vehicles so as 
to reduce the chance of an auto/pedestrian accident; (2) parking 
their vehicle in such a manner as to obscure pedestrians view of 
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the on-coming westbound traffic; (3) failing to insure that the 
pedestrian crosswalk was adequately lighted and marked by flares; 
(4) permitting vehicles to park illegally at the southern end of 
the pedestrian crosswalk so as to obscure pedestrians view of 
westbound traffic. [R. 178 at 1 15] . 
In addition, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant, 
University of Utah was negligent in: (1) providing inadequate 
lighting of said crosswalk area, such the pedestrians in the 
crosswalks were not sufficiently visible to approaching motorists; 
(2) failing to provide adequate temporary warning signs at times of 
heavy pedestrian usage prior to events at the Huntsman Center; and; 
(3) failing to adequately maintain painted markings and signs 
indicating the location of the crosswalk. [R. 179-180 at 1 23] . 
The University of Utah has nothing to do with the maintenance, 
painting, signage, etc, of South Campus Drive. [R. 296-302]. 
South Campus Drive is a State owned road, under the jurisdiction of 
the Utah Department of Transportation. [R. 296-302]. The 
painting, lighting, signage, and maintenance of South Campus Drive 
is the responsibility of the Utah Department of Transportation and 
not the University of Utah. [R. 296-302]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The University of Utah owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs were injured in an automobile-pedestrian accident on a 
roadway owned, maintained, and operated by the Utah Department of 
Transportation, a non-party to this action. The University did not 
have control or custody of the driver of the motor vehicle in 
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question. The plaintiffs were not in the control or custody of the 
University. The plaintiffs were not minors, or members of any 
class whose care had been entrusted to the University. Absent such 
a relationship the University of Utah owed no affirmative duty to 
the plaintiffs to protect them from Malissa Austin's poor driving. 
Because the accident occurred on a public highway, and not on 
the premises of the University of Utah, no landowner liability can 
be shown. A landowner is not liable to the public or business 
invitees for the conditions of the public roadway. Such a claim 
should properly be brought against the agency or government that 
owns and maintains the roadway. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UNIVERSITY OWED NO SPECIFIC 
DUTY OF CARE TO THE CANNONS 
An essential element of a negligence claim is a duty of care 
owed by a defendant to a particular plaintiff. Ferree v. State. 
784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). To establish a negligence claim 
against a public entity, a plaintiff must show the entity breached 
a duty owed specifically to the plaintiff as an individual, rather 
than one owed generally to the public at large. I£. There can be 
no negligence where the entity merely breaches a public duty. Id. 
The existence of such a duty is determined by the court. Weber ex 
rel. Weber v. Sprincrville City. 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986). 
The public duty doctrine is followed in an overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions, State v. Flaniaan, 489 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1986), and Utah is one that has long recognized the rule. 
In Obray v. Malmbercr. 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971), the 
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Supreme Court of Utah held that a sheriff's obligation to 
investigate crime is a duty to the public at large and that a 
breach of this duty isf consequently, not actionable. A similar 
result was reached in Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 
1984). Christenson held that a deputy's statutory duty to "make 
all lawful arrests" was a public obligation rather than a private 
duty to the plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 613. 
The public duty rule was once again relied upon in Ferree v. 
State. 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). Ferree involved a wrongful death 
action alleging that corrections officers were "reckless, negligent 
or grossly negligent" in their failure to supervise a parolee who 
killed the plaintiffs' decedent. In affirming summary judgment, 
the Supreme Court of Utah held that the officers owed no duty of 
care to the victim apart from their general obligation to the 
public at large. Id. at 151. 
The public duty rule applies with equal force to actions 
alleging negligent control of traffic (as opposed to negligent 
maintenance of the roadway). Public entities with traffic control 
responsibilities cannot be held liable in the absence of a 
particular duty to a specific individual. State v. Flanigan. 489 
N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. App. 1986). An obligation to control 
traffic for the general public's benefit simply does not create a 
duty of care on which a negligence claim may be based. Id. 
In Flanigan. the plaintiffs were injured when a car struck 
them as they walked along a state highway to attend a flea market. 
Id. at 1217. Like the instant case, plaintiffs sued the State [of 
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Indiana] claiming it was negligent because it "had a duty to assure 
safe pedestrian and vehicular traffic on the highway and failed to 
provide any traffic control to assure that pedestrians could travel 
on the highways safely." I&. The State moved unsuccessfully for 
judgment on the pleadings and appealed. Id. 
In Flanigan. the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court because the state had no duty to the plaintiffs. Id. at 
1219. Any obligation to provide traffic control was a public duty, 
according to the court, and a breach of such a duty was not 
actionable. .Id. Since there was no particularized duty to protect 
the plaintiffs from errant vehicles, the court held the state was 
not liable. Xd. The court found traffic control to be a non-
actionable public duty. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs' claims of negligence with 
respect to Officers Purvis and Beglarian amount to nothing more 
than failure to generally protect the public through aspects of 
traffic control, a public duty. The alleged negligent acts all go 
to the officers' duties generally, as opposed to any assumed on 
behalf of the plaintiffs specifically. Indeed, it is 
uncontroverted that the officers did not even see the Cannons, who 
on a dark and stormy night, were wearing dark clothing. Even more 
pointedly, Mr. Cannon candidly admits that neither he nor his wife 
saw the officers, and they discussed the fact that no officer would 
be helping them cross the street that evening. Nevertheless, they 
undertook to cross the five lane street as they had done many times 
before. Unlike cases where there are special relationships and 
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reliance; no relationship existed between the Cannons and the 
officers. The Cannons were not relying on the officers in any way. 
Officers Purvis and Beglarian were not engaged in traffic control 
at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs, prior to crossing the 
street, recognized that there was no ongoing traffic control. They 
therefor undertook to cross the street without assistance. Having 
never undertaken a duty to these specific plaintiffs, there can be 
no claim. 
There is simply no basis upon which to impose a duty upon the 
officers other than their duty to the public generally. Yet as 
demonstrated above, failure to perform a duty to the public is not 
actionable. 
The plaintiffs do not dispute that the Public Duty Doctrine 
continues to be recognized by Utah as limiting claims against 
governmental entities for violation of duties owed to the public at 
large. On the night of the accident the officers were engaged in 
one such general duty, that of enforcing the traffic laws governing 
auto and pedestrian travel. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-78. In that 
respect, their job was no different than other types of law 
enforcement, such as investigating alleged burglaries. In each 
given instance, officers have a public duty to enforce the law. 
But they owe no legal duty to come to the aid or assistance of 
anyone in particular. Any failure to do so in this case is no 
different than the failure in Chris tens en v. Hayward. 694 P. 2d 612 
(Utah 1984), where the Court held that a deputy's duty to "make all 
lawful arrests" was a public obligation rather than a private duty 
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to the plaintiff which was not actionable. .Id. at 613. Traffic 
control is enforcing laws governing auto and pedestrian travel, and 
is merely another form of law enforcement, a public duty. Indeed, 
plaintiffs tacitly admit as much. Seeking to overcome the public 
duty obstacle, plaintiffs attempt to bring themselves within the 
"special relationship" exception. That attempt falls short because 
neither Malissa Austin, the driver of the vehicle involved, or the 
plaintiffs were in the custody or control of the University. 
Coffel v. Clallam County. 735 P.2d 686 (Wash. App. 1987), 
cited by the plaintiffs below (R. 400), demonstrates this 
principle. There the court listed the required elements of the 
"special relationship" exception to the public duty doctrine as 
"(1) there is some form of privity between the police department 
and the victim that sets the victim apart from the general public, 
and (2) there are explicit assurances of protection that give rise 
to reliance on the part of the victim." Ifl. at 690. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 
1156 (Utah 1991), sought to more fully explain the meaning of the 
special relationship exception. After stating that the general 
rule, adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314-320 
(1965) , that there is no duty to control the conduct of third 
persons, the Court adopted the Restatement's provision of two 
exceptions to this general rule. First, if a special relation 
exists between the actor and the third person, then the actor has 
a duty to control the third person's conduct. Second, if a special 
relation exists between the actor and the plaintiff. These two 
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exceptions are given more detailed explanation in sections 319 and 
314 respectively of the Restatement. Section 319 provides that one 
who takes charge of a third person, whom is likely to cause bodily 
harm to others if not controlled, is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to control the third person. Section 314A provides 
the four circumstances when a special duty arises between the 
plaintiff and the actor. These circumstances are: (1) a common 
carrier's duty to its passengers, (2) an innkeeper's similar duty 
to its guests, (3) a landowner's duty to invitees on its land, and 
(4) "One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes 
the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the 
other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar 
duty to the other." 
Malissa Austin, the driver has not even been alleged to meet 
the criteria of Restatement, Second, Torts § 319 (1965) as one with 
dangerous propensities. Nor has any effort been made to show that 
she was under the control or supervision of the University of Utah. 
Any special relationship would have to be between the University of 
Utah and the plaintiffs. Clearly the common carrier and innkeeper 
circumstances are not applicable. The landowner circumstance is 
also inapplicable because the public highway was not under the 
control of the University. Restatement, Second, Torts § 349 
(1965). The final circumstance does not apply because the 
plaintiffs were never in the custody or control of the University. 
Because none of the exceptions can apply, the general rule 
must be applicable. Restatement, Second, Torts § 314 (1965) is 
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clear. 
The fact that the actor realizes or should 
realize that action on his part is necessary 
for another's aid or protection does not of 
itself impose upon him a duty to take such 
action. 
In support of their duty argument that a special relationship 
existed, the plaintiffs rely upon two foreign cases, Alhambra 
School District v. Superior Court. 796 P.2d 470, 474 (Ariz. 1990) 
and Florence v. Goldberg. 375 N.E.2d 763, 766 (N.Y. App. 1978). 
For several reasons, plaintiffs' reliance on these cases is 
misplaced. 
First, while the facts of the Alhambra School District case 
are markedly different and distinguishable from the case at hand, 
the case is inapplicable because eight years prior to its decision 
the Arizona Supreme Court flatly rejected the public duty doctrine. 
See. Ryan v. State of Arizona. 656 P.2d 597, 599 (Ariz. 1982). 
Unlike Utah and the majority of states where the public duty 
doctrine recognized, the Arizona Supreme Court specifically found 
that Arizona may no longer benefit from its public status in the 
determination of the existence of a duty. JEd. For this obvious 
reason, Alhambra has no precedential value here. However, even if 
it somehow did, the specific facts of that case highlight its 
inapplicability. 
There, pursuant to a specific Arizona statute, the Alhambra 
School District created a school crossing and therefore by statute 
was required "to operate the crossing in conformance to the Arizona 
School Crossing Manual•n Ifl. at 472. When the defendant school 
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district questioned its duty to the public, the court responded 
"the answer, of course, is that the district applied for and 
established a specifically marked crosswalk, where none previously 
existed." I&. at 474. Under the Arizona statute the creation of 
the crosswalk created a public duty which under Arizona precedent 
did not preclude a negligence claim. The Alhambra court was 
constrained to hold that creation of the walk also created a duty 
of reasonable care. 
However, unlike Alhambra. in the instant case the plaintiffs 
concede that the University was not responsible for and did not 
create the crosswalk. The crosswalk and roadway in question are 
both owned, designed, operated and maintained by the Utah State 
Department of Transportation (UDOT) . UDOT is not a party to the 
instant action. The University was not obligated by law to operate 
it in conformance with any rules or regulations. The limited 
holding of Alhambra is plainly inapplicable. 
The plaintiffs' only other authority, the New York decision of 
Florence v. Goldberg, supra. contains factual differences which not 
only preclude its application here, but also demonstrate the 
absence of the "special relationship" necessary to sustain 
plaintiffs' claim. In Florence, a municipality voluntarily assumed 
a duty to supervise a school crossing for infants at a busy, two-
way street. Indeed, the police department had enacted specific 
regulations with checks to insure that a crossing guard would be 
present at the crossing at the times when small school children 
would be crossing. 
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Every day during the first two weeks of school a mother 
accompanied her small child to and from school and noticed a 
crossing guard at the fatal intersection. Having witnessed the 
daily presence of the crossing guard, the child's mother then 
relied upon the presence and assistance of the guard, and sent her 
child off to school alone one day. Tragically, no guard was 
present and the child was struck by a taxi--because the police 
completely failed to follow their regulations to insure against the 
walk being unguarded. The Court held: 
A municipality whose police department 
voluntarily assumes a duty to supervise school 
crossings, the assumption of that duty having 
been relied upon by parents of school children 
may be held liable for its negligent omission 
to provide a guard at a designated crossing. 
Id. at 585-586 (emphasis added). In stark contrast to the 
plaintiffs' situation here, Florence involved assumption of a duty 
to a specific class of dependent persons, school age children, and 
specific reliance by a parent on the assumption and performance of 
that duty. The same is true of Little v. Utah State Div. of Family 
Services. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). Little involved a young child 
who had been taken into the custody of the State of Utah. The 
child, while under state control, died due to the negligent care of 
the state. In Little, the requisite special relationship was 
demonstrated. 
The Cannons simply cannot make that claim here. The Cannons 
were competent, physically able, adults who undoubtedly had crossed 
streets hundreds of times before the night in question. In fact, 
with respect to the very street where the accident occurred, the 
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Cannons had crossed at that precise location countless times 
before. There is no evidence that the particular crosswalk was 
unreasonably dangerous or that the Cannons needed assistance. Even 
if the crosswalk was defective, it was not owned or operated by the 
University of Utah, but by the Utah Department of Transportation. 
Mr. Cannon's sworn testimony is that upon reaching the 
crosswalk and not seeing any policemen anywhere he remarked to Mrs. 
Cannon that "they're not going to stop the traffic for us now like 
they generally do." (R. 293). Knowing that the police officers 
were not going to stop traffic for them, the Cannons waited for 
some cars to go by and then crossed the street. (IcL) The 
officers here did nothing with respect to the Cannons, and did not 
assume any duty with respect to them. There simply was no 
relationship between the Cannons and the police officers on the 
night in question. Perhaps more importantly, there was no reliance 
by the Cannons upon the officers. Plaintiffs' claim that they had 
somehow been "entrusted to the care" of the University of Utah is 
without support. (Appellants' Brief at 27). They were not under 
the custody or control of the University. No special relationship 
existed that would identify these plaintiffs from any other member 
of the public who might use crosswalks in the vicinity of the 
University of Utah. 
Plaintiffs efforts to find a special relationship between the 
University of Utah and those attending a university sporting event 
is reminiscent of Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 
1986). Beach rejected any special relationship being created by 
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the relationship of student and school. The Supreme Court of Utah 
also held that, absent such a special relationship, the University 
of Utah had no affirmative duty to protect or supervise the 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs are incorrect in alleging that there are any 
material issues of fact that are in dispute. Whether the flares 
were still burning, or the emergency lights on. the University's car 
were operating, are not material. These questions of fact do not 
change the sole important fact that the University of Utah did not 
have a special relationship with the plaintiffs upon which 
liability could be based. 
Accordingly, the trial court was correct when it ruled that 
the University of Utah was entitled to summary judgment dismissing 
the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. 
II. PLAINTIFFS1 LANDOWNER LIABILITY ANALYSIS HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO A POLICE OFFICER'S PUBLIC SAFETY / LAW 
ENFORCEMENT DUTIES. 
Premised upon a landowner liability analysis, plaintiffs argue 
that as "business invitees", defendant owed them a duty of care 
even though the accident at issue did not occur on the property of 
the University of Utah. Fortunately, for unsuspecting businesses, 
this is not the law. On the contrary, as recently stated in 
Dwigqjns v. Marsan Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) and 
Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987), 
cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (1988), "property owners are not 
insurers for the safety of their business invitees." 
The "business invitees" doctrine is inapplicable to this 
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action for two fundamental reasons. First, the instant action 
seeks to impose upon a landowner responsibility for injuries 
sustained off the landowner's premises. 
Secondly, plaintiffs have confused the different nature of 
landowner duties and those attendant with public safety/police 
power functions. 
None of the cases cited by plaintiffs extend a landowner's 
duty to property owned by others. Yet that is precisely what the 
plaintiffs seek to do in the instant case. The plaintiffs readily 
concede that they have no claim against the University for the 
ownership, maintenance or condition of the street in which the 
accident occurred, South Campus Drive. (R. 395, footnote 1). In 
fact, they have specifically withdrawn that claim. (Id.) But 
landowner liability contemplates persons "coming on his property," 
Stevens v. Salt Lake County. 478 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1970), and 
governs claims against a landowner by "one who is injured on his 
property," Tias v. Proctor. 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979). This 
is not a case of an invitee who is injured while watching a game 
due to an unreasonably dangerous condition in the arena. See 
Cimino v. Yale University. 638 F. Supp. 952 (D. Conn. 1986) (goal 
post struck spectator in stadium). 
Despite acknowledging that they may not maintain a claim 
against the University premised upon ownership, the Cannons 
nevertheless seek to impose liability upon the University based 
upon landowner duties. In so doing, they are confusing two 
markedly different and distinct types of duty. On the one hand, a 
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landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance 
of his property to avoid exposing persons who come upon his land to 
an unreasonable risk of harm. 
But that is not a claim that the plaintiffs have made in this 
action and, as they have acknowledged, in light of the fact that 
the street was owned and under the jurisdiction of the Utah 
Department of Transportation, such a claim could not be made 
against the University. 
However, plaintiffs seek to superimpose that landowner duty 
upon University police engaged in a public safety/police protection 
function. The police power is derived from a different source and 
is supported by policies far different than those applicable to a 
landowner. 
Plaintiffs have not suggested that there was a duty to provide 
traffic control in the first instance. On the contrary, plaintiffs 
argue that by undertaking traffic control, defendant was required 
to continue to perform it. The duty plaintiffs claim was breached 
is a law enforcement, not a landowner duty. Accordingly, the 
business invitee analysis offered by plaintiffs has no application. 
Indeed, plaintiffs reliance on Restatement, Second, Torts § 
344 (1965), is misplaced. The applicable provision is found at 
Restatement, Second, Torts § 349 (1965). 
A possessor of land over which there is a 
public highway or private right of way is not 
subject to liability for physical harm caused 
to travelers upon the highway or persons 
lawfully using the way by his failure to 
exercise reasonable care 
(a) to maintain the highway or way in safe 
condition for their use, or 
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(b) to warn them of dangerous conditions in 
the way, which, although not created by him, 
are known to him and which they neither know 
nor are likely to discover. 
No material facts are in dispute. The University of Utah did 
not own, operate, or maintain the roadway in which the accident in 
question occurred. There can be no liability on the University as 
the owner of abutting land. 
III. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN TO PRODUCE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court set out the definition of proximate cause. 
The standard definition of proximate cause is "that 
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces 
the injury and without which the result would not have 
occurred. It is the efficient cause - the one that 
necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish 
the injury." 
697 P.2d at 245 (footnote omitted) . Proximate cause is one of the 
elements of a negligence claim upon which the plaintiffs bear the 
burden of proof. Rather than set forth specific facts 
demonstrating that the conduct of the officers was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiffs1 injuries, plaintiffs instead rely upon the 
general rule that proximate cause in a negligence case is usually 
a jury question. Brief of Appellants at page 35, and speculation 
regarding flares, and the location of the car. But plaintiffs' 
argument is insufficient to create a genuine issue as to proximate 
cause. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that the 
flares were not burning or that the placement of the car had 
anything to do with the accident. On the contrary, the officers 
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testified that the flares were burning and that a driver shouldn't 
have had difficulty seeing pedestrians walking in the two 
northernmost westbound lanes, where the Cannons were struck. Any 
conclusion to the contrary is pure conjecture. 
In Mitchell, the Court noted that "when proximate cause of an 
injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law." 
Id. at 246. The Court also held "There must be evidence that 
establishes a direct causal connection between the negligence and 
the injury." ig. at 245. No such evidence exists here. 
Plaintiffs submitted no evidence to the trial court that would 
show that any action of the defendant, or its employees, was a 
proximate cause of the accident in question. Pursuant to Rule 
56(c) and (e), defendant was entitled to summary judgment. 
Even if the affidavit of plaintiffs' expert witness is 
considered, the result does not change. (R. 378-381). While 
reciting the officers' statements of what they felt their duty was, 
the expert does not give any facts at all upon which to support his 
mere speculation that the accident was caused by the officers. No 
foundation is given as to how the presence of the officers in the 
crosswalk would have resulted in anything other than a possible 
third victim of Ms. Austin's failure to yield to the pedestrians in 
the crosswalk. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN STRIKING THE UNTIMELY AFFIDAVITS 
PROFFERRED BY THE PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs have misstated the standard of review relevant to 
this issue. This Court has stated that it will not reverse a trial 
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court's determination on the admissibility of proffered evidence 
absent an abuse of discretion affecting a party's substantial 
rights. Hardv v. Hardy. 776 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah App. 1989). Hardy 
involved a question of the timeliness of the evidence's receipt and 
the question of an expert witness' qualifications. In Tias v. 
Proctor. 591 P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979), the Court held that 
determination of the question of whether adequate foundation has 
been laid for the introduction of evidence is solely within the 
discretion of the trial court. 
The affidavits of M. Dalton Cannon and David Lord were not 
filed with the trial court until 4:36 p.m. on the evening before a 
9:00 a.m. hearing. (R. 378, 382). A full day was not provided the 
defendant to review or oppose these affidavits. Therefore these 
affidavits were not timely pursuant to Rule 6 (d) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. To rule otherwise would be to permit the late 
filing of affidavits the evening before an early morning hearing as 
a subterfuge to circumvent the provisions of the rule. 
The Affidavit of M. Dalton Cannon is an effort to change Mr. 
Cannon's deposition testimony, presented to the Court by defendant 
in its motion for summary judgment, by means of an affidavit. In 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a contradictory affidavit which wholly fails to 
explain the discrepancy between the deposition and affidavit was 
insufficient to defeat summary judgment. 
Both affidavits were also correctly stricken as being 
immaterial to the issues at hand. Neither of the affidavits are of 
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any benefit to the court in deciding the legal questions under the 
public duty doctrine or landowner liability for accidents occurring 
off the landowner's property. 
Mr. Lord's affidavit concludes that the officers were 
negligent and that this negligence caused, in part, the complained 
of accident. This affidavit is solely the reflection of Mr. Lord's 
unsubstantiated conclusions and fails to contain any supporting 
facts in evidence to support this bald assumption. American 
Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead. 751 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah App. 1988). 
Nowhere does Mr. Lord claim to be an expert on police procedure. 
His testimony is irrelevant and was properly stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly dismissed this action on the basis of 
there being no duty owed by the University of Utah to the 
plaintiffs. For this reason the judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this // day of October, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for University of Utah 
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